

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 039695

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TO USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 039695

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 3092 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LONDON
PARIS ROME MOSCOW BRUSSELS THE HAGUE VIENNA NATO
SALT TWO GENEGA 27 FEB

QUOTE

S E C R E T BONN 03092

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS SECDEF AND USNMR SHAPE FOR INTAF
VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, PFOR, NATO, PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MODIFICATION TO U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY: FRG VIEWS

REF: (A) USNATO 568, (B) USNATO 574, (C) BONN 1644,
(D) BONN 1966 AND 2497

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S
FEB 4 STATEMENT TO NPG PERM REPS AND SUBSEQUENT NPG
DISCUSSION (REFS A AND B), FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 039695

ROTH HAS PROVIDED FURTHER REACTION TO MODIFICATIONS IN
AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY. ROTH SAID FRG ACCEPTS THAT
U.S. "CHANGE OF PHILOSOPHY" ENHANCES THE PRESIDENT'S
RANGE OF OPTIONS ON NUCLEAR RELEASE AND TARGETS OF
VALUE AND BROADENS DOCTRINAL SPECTRUM BETWEEN

MAXIMIZATION OF DETERRENCE AND MINIMIZATION OF DAMAGE. ON APPARENTLY NECESSARY PREMISE OF SOVIET RATIONALITY, BONN CONSIDERS THIS TO BE SOUND APPROACH TO BOLSTER CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE VIS-A-VIS BOTH POTENTIAL ADVERSARY AND ALLIES. ROTH SAID HIS REMAINING QUESTIONS RELATE TO U.S. SELECTIVE FIRST USE AND SILO-BLASTING CAPACITY. END SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR ROTH CALLED IN EMBOFF FEB 22 TO SUPPLEMENT, IN LIGHT OF AMB. RUMSFELD'S FEB 4 STATEMENT TO NPG, HIS REF C REMARKS CONCERNING MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY. ROTH SAID THE US BRIEFING WAS A GOOD ONE, WHICH ANSWERED MANY OF HIS QUESTIONS. THERE WERE A FEW OPEN QUESTIONS, REVIEWED BELOW, BUT ROTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MAY DEFY CLEAR ANSWERS.

2. ROTH SAID HE VIEWED STRATEGIC POLICY QUESTIONS ALONG A CONTINUUM BORDERED ON THE TWO OPPOSITE SIDES BY THE "CONTRADICTORY VALUES" OF MAXIMIZATION OF DETERRENCE AND MINIMIZATION OF DAMAGE. HE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAD SHIFTED U.S. POLICY FROM THE EARLIER DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION, WHICH EMPHASIZED THE MAXIMIZATION OF DETERRENCE (RATHER THAN DAMAGE LIMITATION), TO A POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION. ASSURED DESTRUCTION CALLED FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF JUST ENOUGH OF THE ADVERSARY'S COUNTRY AS TO INSURE "UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE". IT WAS POSITED ON SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY AND REPRESENTED A MOVE ON THE CONTINUUM TOWARD DAMAGE LIMITATION. THIS SHIFT OCCURRED AT A TIME WHEN THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES / INCREASINGLY QUESTIONED THE U.S. READINESS TO "RISK NEW YORK FOR PARIS." THE INDISPENSABILITY OF THE SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY WAS FURTHER UNDERLINED IN THE TERMS OF THE SALT-I ABM AGREEMENT.

3. ROTH SAID HE BELIEVED THE LATEST MODIFICATIONS TO
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 039695

U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY, INCLUDING INCREASED PUBLIC EMPHASIS ON COUNTER-FORCE CAPABILITY, REPRESENTED "A CHANGE OF PHILOSOPHY" DESIGNED TO REFLECT BOTH MAXIMIZATION OF DETERRENCE AND MINIMIZATION OF DAMAGE. THIS WAS DONE BY BROADENING THE OPERATIONAL SPECTRUM FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON NUCLEAR RELEASE AND TARGETS OF VALUE. HE SAID THIS APPROACH SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO THE ADVERSARY THE U.S. DETERMINATION TO DETER AGGRESSION, COUPLED WITH THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON RESULTANT DAMAGE. IN SHORT, ROTH BELIEVED THE U.S. WAS SEEKING TO CARVE OUT A BROADER AREA IN THE CENTER OF THE CONTINUUM, THUS MAXIMIZING U.S. REACTION CAPABILITY

IN THE FACE OF DIVERSE CONTINGENCIES.

4. ROTH SAID THE FRG BELIEVED THIS TO BE A MOST SENSIBLE POLICY--ASSUMING A RATIONAL ADVERSARY. HE SAW NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF SOVIET RATIONALITY, BUT NOTED THAT HISTORY HAD PROVED THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF IRRATIONALITY INCREASES IN CRISIS SITUATIONS ; ACCOUNT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN OF THAT FACT. SO WHILE THE NEW U.S. POLICY ADDED IMPORTANT TOOLS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION MAKING CAPABILITY, THE PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL ABERRANT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN A CRISIS WAS IRRESOLVABLE.

5. ROTH SAID HE SHARED SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S VIEW THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE SEPARATE PROBLEM OF THE SIZE OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES. ROTH READS THE SECDEF SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS AS MEANING THAT IF MOSCOW IS NOT READY TO COME TO TERMS ON A FAIR AND BALANCED SALT-II AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. HAS THE CAPACITY AND DETERMINATION TO BOLSTER ITS STRATEGIC DETERRENT--QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY. THE QUESTION OF "HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH," WOULD BE A MATTER FOR THE USG TO DECIDE SHOULD THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS BE UNSUCCESSFUL.

IN CLOSING, ROTH SAID HE HAD TWO REMAINING QUESTIONS, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED MAY DEFY CLEAR ANSWERS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 039695

THE FIRST QUESTION, ON WHICH ITALIAN AMBASSADOR LUCIOLLI (PORTECT) HAD RECENTLY PRESSED HIM, WAS WHETHER THE ENHANCED RANGE OF U.S. OPTIONS ALSO INCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF "SELECTIVE FIRST USE." ROTH SAID HE HAD REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION TURNED ON "THE DEGREE OF AUTOMATICITY OF ESCALATION." HE ASSUMES FROM THE RUMSFELD STATEMENT (REF A) THAT THERE IS NO SUCH AUTOMATICITY AND THAT THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS TO UTILIZE DETERRENCE AND LIMIT DAMAGE WHILE PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATION. ROTH SAID HE HAD TOLD THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR THAT MOVEMENT UP THE ESCALATION LADDER WOULD BE RAPID ONCE THE FIRST STEP WAS TAKEN AND THAT HE READ THE U.S. EMPHASIS TO BE ON MAXIMIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF OPTIONS. COMMENT: ON THIS AND ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF DISCUSSION, ROTH'S CLEAR PREMISE IS SINGULARITY OF ROLE OF U.S. PRESIDENT IN NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING PROCESS. END COMMENT.

7. ROTH SAID HIS OTHER REMAINING QUESTION IS WHETHER THE U.S. (AND/OR USSR) NOW RPT NOW POSSESSES OR IS SEEKING A SILO-BLASTING CAPACITY. ROTH SAID HE HAD NOTED THE DEPT'S COMMENTS ON ACDA DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT CONCERNING ICBM'S. ROTH SAID HE TENDS TO AGREE WITH THE VIEW THAT,

SOONER OR LATER, FIXED BASE ICBM'S WOULD BECOME OBSOLETE.
IF SOVIET MIRV CAPABILITY IS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, THIS
COULD PROLONG SOMEWHAT THE LIFE OF FIXED BASE ICBM'S.
NONETHELESS, ROTH THINKS THAT MAJOR SOVIET
INVESTMENT IN FIXED BASE ICBM'S MAY PROVE TO BE A
WASTE OF LIMITED RESOURCES. HE THOUGHT U.S. ALLOCATION
OF RESOURCES TO SLBM'S AND BOMBERS WAS A BETTER
INVESTMENT. HILLENBRAND UNQUOTE CASEY

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